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Uranium products, including raw, processed and enriched uranium and fabricated fuel, are necessary for the operation of nuclear power reactors which generate nearly one quarter of electricity in the European Union. In 2024, the EU imported a little over €700 million in Russian uranium products out of a total of €22 billion Russian energy imports (Figure 1). Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and in light of its weaponisation of its natural gas exports, the EU’s exposure to Russian uranium represents a potential strategic risk. Specifically, continuing to do business with Rosatom, the company responsible for the commercial relationship on uranium with the EU, raises four issues for EU policymakers. The EU may need a clearer, phased strategy for eliminating imports of Russian uranium.

Four risks of continued business with Rosatom

The EU exposes itself to four risks by continuing to purchase uranium products from Russia. The first is an energy security risk. Russia is not a trusted trading partner and the painful adjustment following the dramatic reduction in Russian natural gas exports is testament to this. A sudden and unexpected halt to Russian uranium exports would disrupt supply chains with potentially adverse short-term impacts. European utilities are preparing for this risk by stockpiling. 

A second risk is the deepening of bilateral relations between Russia and individual EU countries who import uranium products. This allows the Kremlin to divide EU members and gain leverage that could impede progress on joint foreign policy decisions. For example, Rosatom is currently constructing a new nuclear plant in Hungary, a country that has blocked the imposition of EU sanctions on Russia. 

A third and specific risk concerns Rosatom. Rosatom is deeply embedded within the Russian military complex, including production of nuclear weapons. Rosatom maintains extensive business ties with numerous sanctioned defence companies, such as Rostec, and shares technology, expertise and resources with sanctioned research institutes working on Russian defence. Rosatom representatives have disclosed that they are successfully fulfilling state defence orders (Rosatom, 2023). Rosatom is actively designing and manufacturing various types of weapons and high-tech materials for the Russian army ¹ DiXi Group, ‘5 facts about Rosatom: Threats of future cooperation with the Russian corporation’, 14 March 2024, .

Moreover, the EU’s dual policy of continued cooperation with Russian state-owned companies such as Rosatom while deepening sanctions creates loopholes. Rosatom holds numerous contracts with third countries for building nuclear plants and supplying nuclear fuel, which could be used to conduct financial transactions that bypass sanctions. 

A fourth potential risk is that the EU continues to provide financing for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In 2024, the EU paid more than $700 million for the import of Russian uranium products. While this is a sizeable sum, it is not overly relevant for Rosatom’s overseas earnings, which stood at $18 billion in 2024 (Figure 2). It is also not large compared with the EU’s natural gas bill from Russia of €15 billion annually. The short-term risk of funding the Kremlin is less relevant than the first three strategic risks.

How dependent is the EU on Russia for uranium?

The EU imports Russian products that cover every step of the uranium fuel cycle, mostly as finished products (either enriched uranium or final fuel assemblies). The uranium fuel cycle describes how uranium ore is extracted and processed into a fuel assembly capable of sustaining a nuclear fission reaction (Figure 3). 

Figure 3: An overview of the uranium fuel cycle

Raw uranium 

In 2023, 23 percent of natural uranium used in EU final nuclear products originated from Russia (equivalent to 3,419 tonnes (tU), Figure 4). Replacing the Russian supply of uranium ore does not pose a significant challenge as natural uranium is available abundantly, with Russia providing approximately 5 percent of global primary supply. 

However, Europe is fully dependent on imported uranium. The EU should renew investment in logistics, strengthen partnerships with stable uranium-producing countries including Canada, Australia and Namibia, and support the development of alternative supply routes from Kazakhstan and other central Asian producers. 

^{Source: Supply Agency of the European Atomic Energy Community, Market Observatory 2} Accessed on 17/03/2025, available at: . ^{. Note: the figure shows the proportion of total EU supply from each source. For raw uranium (tonnes), conversion services (tU) and enriched uranium (tSW) this is calculated as an exact proportion. For final fuel assemblies we show the number of reactors of the Soviet VVER-type (19) as ‘Russia’ and the remainder as ‘non-Russia’ (specifically domestic, UK and US).}

Conversion services 

The market for conversion services is concentrated, with only a handful of major providers globally. Russia holds a strong position due to its historically established infrastructure and technical expertise. In 2023, the provision of conversion services to the EU from Russia was 3,543 tU or 27 percent of total supply (Figure 2). The EU primarily imports enriched uranium and fabricated fuel from Russia, not converted uranium (UF₆) directly, therefore these figures represent estimated conversion services performed in Russia on material that eventually reaches the EU in final form. 

Replacing enriched uranium or fabricated fuel from Russia requires additional domestic or imported conversion capacity. The Orano Piralette conversion plant in France, the Cameco plant in Canada and ConverDyn in the US are all aiming to increase capacity. Westinghouse and Cameco are investigating the possibility of building a new conversion facility at Springfields in the UK. This facility could also potentially convert reprocessed uranium – a part of the recycling supply chain over which TVEL, a subsidiary of Rosatom, currently holds a monopoly. It could add an additional 5,000 tU natural uranium conversion capacity and 2,000 tU reprocessed uranium capacity with a timeline for commissioning by the early 2030s. Westinghouse plan to make a final investment decision by late 2025 ³ See Jessica Sondgeroth, ‘Nuclear Fuel: Westinghouse evaluates 2025 Springfields UF6 Plant Revival’, Energy Intelligence, 1 November 2026, . .

Enriched uranium

In 2023, 38 percent of enriched uranium for EU nuclear power plants was imported from Russia, amounting to 4,647 tonnes of separative work (tSW) ⁴ Equivalent to 649 tU of delivered enriched uranium product.  (Figure 2), part of which was contained in fabricated fuel. The largest importers of enriched uranium as UF₆ and UO₂ powder were France and Germany ⁵ Germany imports fuel not for their own nuclear power plants (which are no longer operational) but for the fuel production facility in Lingen . 

The EU has prospects for domestic diversification of supplies with Orano planning to increase capacity by 2,500 tSW ⁶ ‘Uranium Enrichment’, World Nuclear Association, 19 November 2024, , while Urenco is expanding capacity by 1,800 tSW across three projects, both inside and outside of the EU ⁷ See World Nuclear News, ‘Uranium enrichers mark expansion milestones’, 11 October 2024, . . These expansions will permit the replacement of a significant portion of the current 6,600 tSW that the EU and US combined purchase from Russia ⁸ We note that our analysis here and throughout considers replacing Russian supply, assuming the remaining supply and demand remain fixed . Achieving full independence likely requires both of these investments and further capacity investments, with development timelines of five to seven years meaning there is no quick fix. However, strategic inventories are in place to ensure no sudden interruptions of nuclear fuel production.

Final fuel assemblies

There are 99 operational nuclear power reactors in the EU, with an electricity generating capacity of 97 gigawatts. The majority of nuclear fuel is made domestically. However, 19 of these reactors (11-gigawatt capacity) are Soviet-era water-water energetic reactors (VVER), fuel for which is overwhelmingly supplied by Rosatom (IAEA, 2024). Nuclear fuel assemblies are designed specifically for reactor types, and these VVER supplies cannot simply be swapped for alternatives without rigorous checks. 

In 2023, total nuclear fuel imports to the EU were 707 tonnes, of which 573 tonnes came from Russia, up from 314 tonnes in 2022 ⁹ Author’s query to the WITS database, . The sharp increase in imports from Rosatom to the EU is at least partially due to forward-looking strategies aiming to stockpile nuclear fuel for power plants in case of future trade disruptions. VVER utilities now have (on average) two to three years of fuel in hand to mitigate against supply disruptions (IAEA, 2023). New fuel supply chains are needed to replace Rosatom VVER-type fuel. 

1. Framatome attempt to substitute Rosatom supplies

In 2023, Framatome formed a joint venture with Russia’s TVEL, known as the European Hexagonal Fuel SAS, to produce fuel assemblies for VVER reactors in Lingen, Germany. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, these plans were changed to a solely Framatome-led production still operating under TVEL’s license. This cooperation should allow Framatome to start production of final fuel assemblies for VVER-type reactors in Europe. While this could reduce the need to import fuel directly from Russia, Rosatom is still an integral part of the undertaking as licence holder and sub-supplier, and consequently will become more deeply integrated into the European supply chain. There are risks that Rosatom will retain some technological influence through its TVEL license, as well as commercial influence and information access via participation in the board of directors and voting rights on strategic decision-making. 

2. Westinghouse progress in developing new fuel supply chains

Westinghouse Sweden and the Spanish Enusa already produce fuel that can be used in VVER-type reactors and have supplied assemblies to Ukrainian power plants for a number of years, as well as signing contracts or agreements with VVER operating utilities in Slovakia, Czechia, Finland and Bulgaria.

While Hungary has declared its intention to seek alternative sources of nuclear fuel for its Soviet-style reactors ¹⁰ World Nuclear News, ‘Framatome to supply Hungarian plant with nuclear fuel’, 28 October 2024, . , Rosatom is also involved in the construction of new nuclear power plant units in Hungary. The Paks II project, an agreement between Russian Federation and Hungary, launched in 2014. Construction is scheduled to start in early 2025 ¹¹ World Nuclear News, ‘Paks II gets key approval for pouring of first concrete’, 2 December 2024, . .

A fresh European approach to eliminate Russian imports

EU imports of Russian uranium cannot be eliminated overnight. Companies operating within the EU (or in allied countries) have the technological and economic potential to expand capacities sufficiently. However, investments have significant lead times, and a period of up to seven years can be considered for new facilities to come online.

The risk of a Russian imposed supply cut-off, like with natural gas, remains. If the EU passes a policy for gradually reducing Russian supply, as we advocate, this might increase the likelihood of an immediate supply cut-off. Stockpiles held by utilities help to mitigate impacts of this risk in the short run and the best way to eliminate any adverse impact is to expand alternative supply.

A structured European approach is needed to phase down imports of Russian uranium, rooted in two priorities: i) expanding domestic supply and improving competitiveness; ii) gradually reducing market access for Rosatom. Plans are in place to expand domestic supply and should be appropriately supported.

A phased embargo should be considered for reducing Russian imports. This could begin by limiting imports of enriched natural uranium for which supply disruption would be minimal thanks to existing stockpiles. In a second step, the embargo should be extended to imports of fabricated fuel for VVER-type reactors. In both cases, a European legal basis (such as an embargo) would be required for utilities to declare force majeure on long-term contracts held with Rosatom, some running into the 2030s. Companies could apply for waivers on national security grounds if continued Russian imports are deemed essential beyond the cut-off date, as under US sanctions on uranium.

References

IAEA (2023) ‘Global Inventories of Secondary Uranium Supplies’, IAEA TECDOC Series 2020, International Atomic Energy Agency, available at 

IAEA (2024) ‘Nuclear Power Reactors in the World’, Reference Data Series No. 2, International Atomic Energy Agency, available at 

Rosatom (2023) Performance of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom, Annual Report, available at